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Abstract
Background: Public health surveillance and epidemiologic investigations are critical public health functions for
identifying threats to the health of a community. Very little is known about how these functions are conducted at the
local level. The purpose of the Epidemiology Networks in Action (EpiNet) Study was to describe the epidemiology and
surveillance response to the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) by city and county health departments in the San
Francisco Bay Area in California. The study also documented lessons learned from the response in order to strengthen
future public health preparedness and response planning efforts in the region.
Methods: In order to characterize the epidemiology and surveillance response, we conducted key informant
interviews with public health professionals from twelve local health departments in the San Francisco Bay Area. In
order to contextualize aspects of organizational response and performance, we recruited two types of key informants:
public health professionals who were involved with the epidemiology and surveillance response for each jurisdiction,
as well as the health officer or his/her designee responsible for H1N1 response activities. Information about the
organization, data sources for situation awareness, decision-making, and issues related to surge capacity, continuity of
operations, and sustainability were collected during the key informant interviews. Content and interpretive analyses
were conducted using ATLAS.ti software.
Results: The study found that disease investigations were important in the first months of the pandemic, often
requiring additional staff support and sometimes forcing other public health activities to be put on hold. We also
found that while the Incident Command System (ICS) was used by all participating agencies to manage the response,
the manner in which it was implemented and utilized varied. Each local health department (LHD) in the study
collected epidemiologic data from a variety of sources, but only case reports (including hospitalized and fatal cases)
and laboratory testing data were used by all organizations. While almost every LHD attempted to collect school
absenteeism data, many respondents reported problems in collecting and analyzing these data. Laboratory capacity
to test influenza specimens often aided an LHD’s ability to conduct disease investigations and implement control
measures, but the ability to test specimens varied across the region and even well-equipped laboratories exceeded
their capacity. As a whole, the health jurisdictions in the region communicated regularly about key decision-making
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related to the response, and prior regional collaboration on pandemic influenza planning helped to prepare the
region for the novel H1N1 influenza pandemic. The study did find, however, that many respondents (including the
majority of epidemiologists interviewed) desired an increase in regional communication about epidemiology and
surveillance issues.
Conclusion: The study collected information about the epidemiology and surveillance response among LHDs in the
San Francisco Bay Area that has implications for public health preparedness and emergency response training, public
health best practices, regional public health collaboration, and a perceived need for information sharing.
Keywords: Influenza A (H1N1), Epidemiology, Surveillance, Public health preparedness, Public health emergency
response
Background
Surveillance and epidemiologic investigations are criti-
cal public health functions for identifying threats to the
health of a community. In an emergency, public health
surveillance is “the ongoing systematic collection, anal-
ysis, interpretation, and management of public health-
related data to verify a threat or incident of public health
concern, and to characterize and manage it effectively
through all phases of the incident” [1].
Once an event has been detected, public health depart-
ments conduct epidemiologic investigations to confirm
that there is, indeed, a health threat in the community,
identify the source of the disease, injury, or exposure, and
describe the characteristics of its occurrence with respect
to time, place, and persons affected. Health departments
collect this information to determine which control mea-
sures to implement to most effectively prevent further
illnesses, injuries, or exposures. Thus, timely public health
surveillance and epidemiologic investigations are crucial
activities for an effective public health response because
they allow public health officials to gather health informa-
tion, prioritize response activities, and make appropriate
public health decisions.
Although public health surveillance and epidemiologic
investigations are important, very little is known about
how these functions are conducted at the local level. Pub-
lic health professionals who conduct epidemiologic func-
tions at the local level may belong to diverse professional
disciplines and have varying levels of formal training in
epidemiology [2]. Epidemiologic investigations during a
public health emergency are conducted through networks
of public health professionals and other partners [3], but
how these networks work during an emergency is not well
understood.
Previous research studies have demonstrated a recent
decline in the epidemiology capacity of local and state
health departments across the nation. According to
national surveys conducted by the Council of State
and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), the epidemiology
capacity among state health departments declined by 12%
from 2004 to 2009, especially in program areas such as
bioterrorism and emergency response [4]. State health
departments in the United States needed an additional
1,490 epidemiologists in 2009. Other research studies
have found that, from 2001 to 2007, state health depart-
ments had increasing levels of responsibility, such as pro-
viding additional preventative services and oversight of
hospitals and other institutions. These studies also found
that all emerging practice areas, such as bioterrorism
preparedness, injury control and prevention, tobacco con-
trol and prevention, and environmental epidemiology had
expanded [5]. Despite the decline in epidemiology capac-
ity, public health surveillance and epidemiologic investi-
gations continue to be important and expanding functions
for responding to public health threats in our communi-
ties [6], and they constitute one of the fifteen public health
preparedness capabilities for state and local public health
preparedness activities [1].
The emergence of novel influenza A (H1N1) in 2009
On April 17, 2009, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) determined that infection with a novel
influenza A (H1N1) virus caused two cases of febrile respi-
ratory illness occurring in children in southern California
[7]. Subsequently, cases of human infection with the
same strain of novel influenza A (H1N1) were reported
in Mexico, Canada, and other countries [8]. On April
20, 2009, the 61 local health departments (LHDs) in
California along with the California Department of Public
Health (CDPH) initiated enhanced surveillance for hos-
pitalized and fatal cases of pandemic influenza A (H1N1)
because there was a lack of information at that time
about the severity of illness, clinical features of infec-
tion, and the populations at risk for complications from
pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection [9]. Because this
new strain of swine influenza A (H1N1) had not cir-
culated in humans previously, there was concern that a
large proportion of the population would be susceptible
to infection and that seasonal influenza vaccine would not
provide protection.
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The purpose of the Epidemiology Networks in Action
(EpiNet) Study was to describe the epidemiology and
surveillance response to the 2009 pandemic influenza
A (H1N1) by city and county health departments in the
San Francisco Bay Area in California, as well as document
lessons learned from the response, in order to strengthen
future public health preparedness and response planning
efforts in the region.
Conceptual framework
The epidemiology and surveillance response to pandemic
influenza A (H1N1)
The ability to diagnose and investigate health problems in
the community is one of the ten essential public health
services [10]. Epidemiology skills and capacity play an
important role in describing the impact of a health threat,
measuring its magnitude, and developing interventions
and testing their effectiveness. Thus, local and state pub-
lic health agencies collect public health surveillance data,
draw epidemiologic inferences from the data, and make
decisions for public health action based on these infer-
ences (so called “data for action”[6]).
An effective public health surveillance and epidemi-
ology response requires the cohesive interplay between
many public health activities. Using a conceptual frame-
work published by McNabb et al. [11], which describes
the interdependent processes of public health surveillance
and public health action in the context of health sector
reform, we modified the framework to emphasize the role
and importance of epidemiologic inference in taking pub-
lic health action (Figure 1). The conceptual framework
describes six public health surveillance activities (Figure 1,
(A) Public Health Surveillance): (1) case detection; (2)
the collection of specific descriptive characteristics of
each case, which are entered or registered into a pub-
lic health record (registration); (3) confirmation of the
cases through the evaluation of epidemiologic criteria
and/or laboratory results; (4) reporting of the cases from
lower levels of the public health system to higher ones;
(5) analyses of the case information; and (6) flow of
information from the higher levels of the public health
system back down to the lower ones (feedback). After
the data are interpreted (Figure 1, (B) Epidemiologic
Inference), public health actions (Figure 1, (C) Pub-
lic Health Action) can take two forms: (1) acute or
epidemic-type responses, which include immediate pub-
lic health actions such as epidemiologic investigations,
contact investigations, and targeted interventions, or (2)
planned or management-type responses, such as commu-
nity public health education, purchasing of immunization
supplies, and re-allocating public health personnel and
resources in response to changing disease trends. In this
conceptual framework, four support activities (Figure 1,
(D) Support Activity) are designed to improve the core
functions: communications, training, supervision, and
resource-provision. Thus, public health surveillance and
public health actions can be viewed as interdependent
processes that relate to one another through inflow and
outflow of data, information, and messages.
Local health departments are decision-making entities
that take actions based on information in their environ-
ments [12]. Like other organizations, they consist of a net-
work of components (i.e., people, resources, knowledge,
and tasks) and the relations among these components
Figure 1 Conceptual framework of public health surveillance and public health action. The figure was adapted from McNabb et al. [11] and
modified to emphasize the importance of epidemiologic inferences.
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[13]. An organization adapts to situations by altering the
set of people, resources, knowledge, tasks, or the rela-
tions among these components to achieve its objectives.
Like other emergency response organizations, an LHD
responds and coordinates through social networks, which
has implications for its ability to coordinate during a
response [3]. Like other emergency response personnel,
public health professionals act within the limits of avail-
able information [14] – information that must be commu-
nicated in a timely manner by external agents – to inform
how they will respond in a dynamic, changing environ-
ment [15]. Public health personnel collect information
within their health jurisdiction in order to determine what
is happening in any situation, but may also use exter-
nal sources beyond their jurisdiction in order to maintain
broader situation awareness. As a result, it is crucial to
understand with whom public health personnel commu-
nicated, both within and outside of their organizations,
in order to maintain situation awareness during the pan-
demic.
This study focused on the four components of the
public health system (i.e., the mission, structural capac-
ity, processes, and outcomes [16]) that were involved in
these activities, rather than the entire public health sys-
tem. During any infectious disease emergency, local and
state health departments have many key objectives, which
include identifying any threats to the health of communi-
ties and preventing future morbidity and mortality from
occurring (see section List of Public Health objectives in
an emergency).
Public health objectives in an emergency
Objectives
1. Detect the incident.
• Advance warning enables the system to respond
sooner.
2. Define the incident.
• Describe the situation in terms of person, place,
and time.
3. Define the at-risk population.
• Target limited resources.
4. Measure the magnitude of the incident.
• Obtain valid data on needs and health status of
the affected community.
• Guide response efforts in terms of providing
needed services.
5. Forecast the incident and predict future impact.
• Anticipate future morbidity and mortality.
• Anticipate the at-risk populations.
• Anticipate future needs for resources and health
care.
6. Develop interventions and test their effectiveness.
• Alleviate the burden of impact of the incident on
the health of individuals and their communities.
7. Monitor the ongoing situation.
• Guide response efforts if the situation changes.
Methods
Study population
The Association of Bay Area Health Officials (ABAHO)
is a group of health officers and health directors from
thirteen city and county health departments in the San
Francisco Bay Area that meets on a regular basis to dis-
cuss important public health issues [17]. In November
2006, ABAHO convened a Pandemic Influenza Planning
Work Group to increase collaboration for regional pan-
demic influenza planning. This group consisted of rep-
resentatives from twelve cities and counties in the San
Francisco Bay Area: Alameda, City of Berkeley, Contra
Costa, Marin, Napa, San Benito, San Francisco, San
Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, and Sonoma
[18]. In order to understand the strengths and weak-
nesses of this regional network of LHDs, the EpiNet
study focused its investigation on the twelve cities
and counties that participated in the ABAHO Pan-
demic Influenza Planning Work Group since 2006 (now
called the ABAHO Public Health Preparedness Sub-
committee). The twelve LHDs are shown in Figure 2
and the populations they serve are summarized in
Table 1.
The study was approved by the Committee for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects at the University of California
at Berkeley.
Recruitment of key informants
In order to recruit individuals into the study, one of
the investigators (TJA) sent an email to health officers
of the local health jurisdictions informing them of the
study’s goals and objectives. The health officers identified
the appropriate persons within their organizations to be
interviewed. The research staff scheduled interviews with
individuals who responded and consented to participate.
In addition, a presentation was given at an ABAHO Public
Health Preparedness Subcommittee meeting in order to
inform additional public health professionals in the region
about the study. Members of the Public Health Prepared-
ness Subcommittee identified additional key informants
for the study.
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Figure 2 The Association of Bay Area Health Officials.
Data collection
In order to understand how each local health jurisdic-
tion conducted its epidemiology and surveillance activ-
ities, research staff (WE, AC, and JB) conducted key
informant interviews with public health professionals at
Table 1 ABAHO cities and counties
Local health department 2009 Population estimate†
Alameda county 1,491,482
City of Berkeley‡ 101,555
Contra Costa County 1,041,274
Napa County 134,650
Marin County 250,750
San Benito County 55,058
City & County of San Francisco 815,358
San Mateo County 718,989
Santa Clara County 1,784,642
Santa Cruz County 256,218
Solano County 407,234
Sonoma County 472,102
†The 2009 population estimate is according to the U.S. Census Bureau.
‡The City of Berkeley is within the jurisdictional boundaries of Alameda County.
two different levels within each organization: (1) epi-
demiologists and/or public health professionals respon-
sible for the epidemiology and surveillance activities in
response to novel influenza A (H1N1), and (2) health
officers or their designees who were responsible for over-
seeing the response to H1N1 (e.g., deputy health offi-
cers). Semi-structured key informant interviews were
conducted from September 2010 to March 2011, admin-
istered by an interviewer to direct the discussions.
The number of respondents interviewed per organiza-
tion ranged from one to three, with an average of two
respondents per organization. Most interviews lasted
between 60 and 90 minutes. Written informed consent
was obtained from each participant at the start of the
interview.
During the interviews, key informants were asked about
their organization’s structure, case and contact investi-
gations, data sources for situation awareness, laboratory
testing, other public health emergencies or outbreaks that
may have occurred during the H1N1 response, and net-
works of public health professionals utilized during the
response. Through interviews with representatives from
the local health jurisdictions, information about day-to-
day operations as well as decision-making considerations
involved in the public health response was collected. The
key informant interviews were recorded and the audio
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files were transcribed. The study staff conducted a total of
23 interviews with key informants among eleven ABAHO
cities and counties. Each key informant was offered a
$50 VISA gift card for participating in the study. The
twelfth local health jurisdiction declined to participate
in interviews but instead completed a written question-
naire adapted from the original key informant interview
guide. For the purpose of reporting results, this organiza-
tion’s responses have been aggregated along with the other
organizations’ responses where appropriate.
Additional documents pertaining to the organizations’
epidemiology and surveillance response activities (e.g.,
After Action Reports (AARs), surveillance reports, data
analysis summaries, etc.) were collected and reviewed as
needed. The review of additional documents served to
corroborate statements made during the interviews as
well as to obtain a more in-depth understanding of each
organization’s actions during the response.
Data analysis
Content and interpretive analyses were performed on all
interview transcripts to identify key themes and concepts
as described by the key informants. A preliminary code-
book was developed from the questions included in the
key informant interview guides and the descriptive coding
of the first four transcripts reviewed (two epidemiolo-
gist and two health officer transcripts). Descriptive coding
for the development of the preliminary codebook was
conducted by two research team members (AC, JF). The
coding between the two research teammembers was com-
pared for consistency followed by group discussions with
the full research team (AC, JF, WT, and WTAE). Coding
of additional transcripts was conducted by one individ-
ual (AC), and new codes were developed throughout the
coding process, as they emerged from the data. After all
of the transcripts were reviewed, a complete codebook
of descriptive codes and family codes was completed and
finalized. Codes were grouped independently into fami-
lies and sub-families. Independent groups were compared
and all families and sub-families were created through dis-
cussion. Codes were created and analyzed using ATLAS.ti
software.
Results
The information obtained in the key informant interviews
is summarized in this section by the main topics: disease
investigation and surge capacity, use of the Incident Com-
mand System (ICS) to manage the public health response,
epidemiologic data sources for situation awareness, lab-
oratory capacity for novel influenza A (H1N1) testing,
and regional communication. Table 2 provides a sum-
mary of the 23 respondents’ titles, average years served in
their organization, and the average number of personnel
directly supervised by the respondents.
Disease investigations and surge capacity
The EpiNet study focused heavily on the initial response
to the emergence of the H1N1 pandemic, including the
high level of disease investigation activities that occurred
in the spring and summer of 2009. During the initial
phase of the pandemic all cases of laboratory-confirmed
novel influenza A (H1N1) were reported to CDPH,
including all influenza-related hospitalizations and
deaths. Beginning July 15, 2009, LHDs were asked to
report only hospitalizations, fatalities and outbreaks of
novel H1N1 influenza to CDPH; reporting of individual
outpatient cases was no longer required [19]. On August
12, 2009, LHDs were asked to report hospitalized cases of
novel H1N1 influenza as weekly aggregate numbers.
Intensive care unit cases and fatal cases continued to be
reported using individual case report forms [20]. These
reporting guidelines provided by CDPH were adhered to
by each LHD in the EpiNet study, although many
participants noted that the rapidly-changing guidelines
resulted in “information overload”.
“There was a flood of information sent out, more than
we could keep up with initially. Just keeping track of
daily reports and changing advice...felt like a full time
job all by itself.”
In order to comply with these reporting guidelines,
case investigations were conducted during the initial
wave of the H1N1 pandemic by all 12 LHDs in the
EpiNet study. Investigations were conducted to iden-
tify the source of the H1N1 influenza virus, facilitate
timely diagnoses, implement control measures, and aid
in the characterization of the virus. The type of staff
members involved in case investigations varied by LHD
and included public health nurses, disease investigators,
epidemiologists, and health officers. In many cases, the
number of staff normally assigned to disease investiga-
tion tasks was not sufficient to handle the volume of
case and contact investigations at the outset of the pan-
demic. In these instances, additional staff were brought
in either to assist directly with disease investigations
or to backfill positions being vacated by those involved
in the investigations. These additional staff, referred to
as “surge capacity staff”, included nurses from sections
other than communicable disease control, staff from
some agencies’ tuberculosis or sexually-transmitted dis-
ease units, and/or recently retired public health employ-
ees. An LHD’s ability to recruit additional staff from
within its agency depended largely on the support of
the agency’s leadership, pre-existing plans and proce-
dures, and resources available to the particular LHD.
In addition to obtaining surge staff from within their
LHD, some agencies reported receiving assistance from
external sources. One LHD received assistance from
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Table 2 Respondent roles in 2009
Respondent title Number of Average years in Average number of
respondents organization personnel supervised
Supervising epidemiologist 3 6 3
Epidemiologist 7 6 0
Emergency services specialist 1 18 0
Health officer 5 16 4
Health officer/director 3 11 6
Deputy health officer 4 8 6
a CDC Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer, another
reported obtaining support through its jurisdiction’sMed-
ical Reserve Corps (MRC), and yet another described
receiving assistance from other public agencies in its
jurisdiction.
While some surge staff were familiar with the activities
involved in their new assignments, many were unfamil-
iar with communicable disease control and epidemiology
functions and required Just-in-Time Training (JITT) in
conducting case and contact investigations, as well as in
using personal protective equipment, such as N95 respi-
rators. Ten of the twelve LHDs reported providing some
level of training for surge staff.
“In an urgent or emergency situation or a situation like
this in which the DOC is expanded, then we have a need
to bring more people in, so we brought in other public
health nurses who may or may not have received specific
training in this area, but certainly got JITT training and
were given their...job descriptions and their objectives
and the tools that they needed to assist with the work.
And so that was fairly successful, but at the same time it
was also challenging because it required pulling people
from their normal day-to-day work...which you know,
brings up the importance of continuity of operations
planning for the entire department.”
Further emphasizing the need for surge capacity staff
was the fact that many respondents reported other infec-
tious disease outbreaks during the H1N1 pandemic,
including tuberculosis, pertussis, and measles, as well as
more “routine” outbreaks, such as norovirus. While the
“routine” events were not reported to have had an impact
on continuity of operations for most departments, cases
of measles and tuberculosis required a more significant
response.
“Previously when we had a measles case, we had done
an activation for those and done isolation and
quarantine and it was extensive. But we couldn’t do all
of those activities. We couldn’t activate for that when
we’re activated for flu. ...Part of that is trying to think
carefully about how you’re going to use public health
resources. Do we need this level of follow-up based on
’XYZ’ situation? We definitely had less of a response
and part of that was because of resources.”
Given limited resources, organizations had to prioritize
public health activities and, in some cases, delayed day-to-
day tasks in order to handle the H1N1 response. Twelve of
the 23 respondents specifically indicated that, to varying
degrees, other tasks were put aside.
“I think that the continuity was really on a very limited
basis. Of course we... took all our reports and followed
through, but it was really on a very limited basis...
throughout the entire agency we were focused on H1N1.
We have a continuity of operations plan on paper but it
wasn’t, it really wasn’t implemented.”
Use of the incident command system tomanage the public
health response
While disease investigations were an important compo-
nent of LHDs’ early response to the H1N1 pandemic,
many other staff, including emergency preparedness man-
agers and laboratorians also played important roles. In
order to effectively manage key staff from a variety of
sections, including the surge capacity staff providing addi-
tional support for key functions, all 12 LHDs in the EpiNet
study implemented ICS. Yet, while the implementation of
this system was universal, the manner in which ICS was
implemented and utilized varied among the LHDs. For
instance, while most health departments indicated that
ICS was employed continuously throughout the response
period, two health departments reported activating ICS in
two separate phases. The initial phase focused on situa-
tion awareness and characterization of the epidemiology
of novel influenza A (H1N1) infection, while the second
phase focused on vaccine distribution after the vaccine
became available.
Only one agency reported strict adherence to the ICS
structure and reporting guidelines. It was far more com-
mon for LHDs to use the ICS structure and reporting
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process intermittently, often reverting to their day-to-day
structure and reporting for managing the response. Some
agencies employed a modified version of ICS to suit their
organizational needs (such as combining the Logistics and
Finance sections). For some agencies, this was a matter
of convenience, while others admitted that knowledge of
ICS among staff members was inadequate, stating that
“our own use of ICS was clumsy because we don’t have
a broadly held understanding of ICS, including at the
highest levels [of the organization]”.
The study found that agencies that used ICS to man-
age previous events, such as seasonal influenza or tuber-
culosis investigations, were able to utilize staff with
ICS experience, while other LHDs with less experience
in ICS needed “Just-in-Time Training” during the pan-
demic. The LHDs that utilized ICS for responding to
other events prior to novel influenza A (H1N1) were
able to make use of lessons learned from previous ICS
activations to adjust their ICS response to the pan-
demic, resulting in smoother implementation during the
response.
“One of the things that we’ve changed is that...we’re
taking every opportunity to use real events to exercise
the use of ICS and the DOC [Departmental Operations
Center] and the emergency response structure. ...I think
it’s much more engaging for people and helps us learn a
lot better if we treat actual occurrences that might not
really necessitate the use of ICS or the DOC, but treat
them as exercises to rev up all of that, to reinforce our
use of [ICS] and to practice using it so that we are more
adept at it if we really need to do it.”
Respondents provided specific insights into some of
the obstacles to implementing ICS, including: (1) staff
were assigned to ICS roles that did not align with their
skill sets or job functions (for example, an epidemiolo-
gist being assigned the lead for the Logistics section); (2)
staff within the ICS structure often reported to staff other
than their day-to-day supervisors, complicating commu-
nication efforts; (3) there were barriers to obtaining the
necessary permissions for staff to access data as part of
their ICS duties; (4) staff responsible for critical response
functions were burdened by additional ICS leadership
responsibilities; and (5) LHDs struggled with where to
place epidemiology and surveillance staff and functions
within the ICS organizational chart. Two LHDs placed
epidemiologists within the Planning section of their ICS
structure, while the other ten LHDs placed epidemiolo-
gists within the Operations section. One respondent (an
epidemiologist) from an LHD that placed epidemiologists
within the Operations section stated that, in the future,
the organization would prefer to place epidemiologists
in the Planning section in order to help directly inform
the development of the Incident Action Plan, a critical
function of the Planning section.
“You know, we tried to pass information [to help the
development of the Incident Action Plan] along to the
Planning section but I think there’s been a lot of
confusion where to place the epidemiologists within the
[ICS organizational] chart. I keep going back and forth
and as a result of this response, I think they’re going to
place me back in with Plans.”
The above quote highlights the importance of epi-
demiology functions within the ICS structure. Public
health staff carrying out epidemiology and surveillance
functions were tasked with managing a number of data
sources to inform situation awareness and often aided
key-decisionmakers in translating the data into actionable
recommendations.
Epidemiologic data sources for situation awareness
The key informants in the study identified numerous
data sources used for situation awareness during the pan-
demic (Table 3). The data collection efforts were highly
dependent upon the external relationships that had been
developed prior to or during the pandemic by each LHD.
Coordination and communication between LHDs and
CDPH, area hospitals, clinics, long-term care facilities,
schools, and other organizations were important for dis-
ease surveillance, particularly in the early stages of the
pandemic. Local health departments leveraged partner-
ships with community organizations and businesses in
their jurisdictions to collect information and communi-
cate effectively about the H1N1 pandemic.
All health jurisdictions utilized case reports, reporting
of hospitalized and fatal cases, and laboratory test results
to inform their understanding of the H1N1 pandemic and
Table 3 Epidemiologic data sources for situation
awareness
Type of data Number of local health departments
Case reports 12
Hospitalized/Fatal cases 12
Laboratory data 12
School absenteeism 11
Emergency room census 9
ILI sentinel surveillance 5
Vital statistics data 5
Hospital bed count 4
Workplace absenteeism 2
911 Calls/Logs 2
Other syndromic surveillance 2
Abbreviations: ILI, influenza-like illness.
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to guide their response. Hospital data (including
information on co-morbidities), demographic data, and
laboratory data were all reported as being particularly
useful for characterizing the pandemic because they were
reliable data sources. One respondent explained that
medical data, as opposed to other syndromic data
sources, were the most useful and consistent.
“There are a lot of ways you can try to do flu
surveillance and epi but the only one that really works
is through clinic care, through the medical community.
Because no one else anywhere has an obligation to
report anything or an incentive to report anything or a
system designed to make it possible to report anything.”
Nine LHDs captured emergency room or outpatient
data that were usually characterized by chief complaint or
presenting symptoms. LHDs also made use of influenza-
like illness “sentinels” that reported outpatient data to
CDPH; vital statistics, such as the number of deaths from
pneumonia and influenza; and hospital bed counts. A
minority of the LHDs in the study also utilized work-
place absenteeism rates, 911 calls, medical dispensing
data, poison control center calls, and airport surveillance.
Eleven LHDs utilized school absenteeism data, with
varying degrees of success. Nine respondents discussed
specific challenges related to school absenteeism data
which, for most LHDs, were a newly acquired data
source. Respondents explained that absenteeism data
rarely included information about the specific illness
causing the reported absence and that data collection
systems among school districts were not standardized
and difficult to aggregate; in many cases absenteeism data
systems were not automated and required manual
collection, entry, and transfer of data in order to obtain.
“School reporting is really tricky. We have eleven school
districts in the county and I wouldn’t say that each one
has its own system, but there are many different systems
used by the different districts for tracking attendance
and some of them can give reasonably frequent data on
student absences and student enrollment from which
you can calculate percent absent. Some of them, but not
very many, get information about whether absence is
due to illness or not. Most of them don’t.”
While LHDs obtained data from a number of sources
in order to monitor the H1N1 pandemic, there were
instances in many organizations when not all of the
desired data were obtainable. One respondent wanted
additional outpatient data from private health care
providers because the health department did not have
influenza sentinel surveillance data for its jurisdiction.
Other data that were sought included more complete
school absenteeism data, length of stay data for hos-
pitalized patients, workplace absenteeism data, and the
number of negative influenza test results from the pub-
lic health laboratory in order to provide a denominator to
accompany the number of positive tests reported for novel
H1N1.
Laboratory capacity for novel influenza A (H1N1) testing
As noted earlier, the study found that laboratory data were
particularly valuable sources of information for LHDs
during the pandemic response. The lack of capacity to
test influenza specimens at the local level using reverse-
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) nega-
tively affected case and contact investigations and slowed
LHDs’ ability to determine the status of suspected
influenza cases, which in turn slowed the implementation
of mitigation efforts.
The CDPH Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory
(VRDL) obtained the necessary reagents for subtyping the
2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus early in the pandemic, but
these reagents were only available to some LHDs later. Of
the twelve health jurisdictions interviewed, eight LHDs
reported having the capability to test influenza specimens
for novel influenza A (H1N1) to the level of “Influenza
A (unsubtypable)” during the pandemic (it should also
be noted that two of these eight LHDs shared a sin-
gle, jointly-operated public health laboratory). Among
these eight LHDs, three reported obtaining the necessary
reagents during the course of the pandemic to subtype
influenza specimens. The four LHDs without influenza
testing capabilities either sent their specimens to the state
laboratory for testing (two LHDs) or utilized a neigh-
boring jurisdiction’s laboratory (two LHDs). All juris-
dictions reported submitting specimens to the VRDL at
CDPH for additional testing and virus characterization, as
required by evolving guidance issued by CDC during the
pandemic.
At least one health department reported that, despite
being equipped with a laboratory for influenza testing, the
capacity of the laboratory was exceeded during the initial
phase of the pandemic, when testing was being performed
on a high volume of specimens.
“We had so many [specimens], the lab, it was like trying
to...get a fire hydrant’s worth of water through a
pipette...I mean it was just ridiculous.”
Another challenge reported by respondents included
laboratories lacking appropriate systems to prioritize the
testing of certain specimens. It was noted by some juris-
dictions that health care providers were either not testing
patients for influenza often enough or were relying too
heavily on rapid diagnostic influenza tests, which have
been reported to have lower sensitivity to detect 2009
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H1N1 virus in upper respiratory specimens when com-
pared to real-time RT-PCR [21].
“I really think that until the tests improve that we’re
going to be limited in our surveillance. As I mentioned,
we had a really hard time convincing providers not to
do the rapid test, which is a terrible test for H1N1.
[There was a] real resistance to using nasopharyngeal
swabs [among providers].”
Despite the challenges faced by many public health lab-
oratories during the pandemic, regional support, in the
form of shared public health laboratories, testing provided
by neighboring health jurisdictions, and support from
CDPH’s VRDL helped to alleviate some of the pressure
faced by LHDs in the Bay Area.
Regional communication among the Association of Bay
Area Health Officials
Laboratory testing was not the only area in which LHDs
collaborated on a regional level during the pandemic. The
members of ABAHO convened regular conference calls to
discuss each LHD’s efforts to control novel H1N1. Topics
of discussion included school closures, the use of antivi-
rals and personal protective equipment, vaccine priority
groups, and vaccine distribution. Interviews with health
officers, deputy health officers, and health directors con-
firmed the value that the majority of participants found in
these regional discussions. As one health officer explained,
“I wouldn’t miss an ABAHO call if I could help
it...[T]alking to people who are making decisions that
are going to happen in the county next to you is, without
exception, an incredibly important thing to do.”
Another health officer noted the value of understanding
one’s peers’ perspectives, even if they differed from one’s
own.
“...I think just talking to people who know the field, are
smart – that’s just really helpful. It’s different
perspectives and it’s okay they had different perspectives
because I don’t think any of us know the right answers,
but it was just helpful to kind of hear other people’s
perspectives and either cement your opinion or have
your opinion changed.”
The ABAHOmembers discussed a number of key deci-
sions related to influenza mitigation. During the H1N1
pandemic, each of the LHDs established new (or made use
of existing) relationships with schools in its jurisdiction.
With rapidly-changing guidance on school closures from
CDC [22] and little scientific evidence of effectiveness to
rely on, many health officers were tasked with deciding
whether or not to close schools in an effort to slow the
spread of H1N1 in their communities.While CDC initially
recommended closing schools for up to 14 days when a
laboratory-confirmed case of influenza was detected, they
soon changed the policy to focus on keeping sick individ-
uals out of schools and childcare facilities for the duration
of their illness[23]. One health officer described the situ-
ation and their communication with other health officers
in the ABAHO network,
“...ABAHO did also work with the state and maybe also
with CDC about change in the school closure guidance
early on... There was a lot of really extreme and early
recommendations out there that some people felt very
compelled to follow. And then CDC was reviewing it
and deciding to change it, and CDPH was deciding to
change it. And we’re like, ’guys, we’re out here, we’ve got
schools’... So we were kind of in this awkward place
where the formal recommendation says you have to do
this but everybody thinks you actually don’t.”
Ultimately, five of the twelve LHDs made the decision
to close schools in an attempt to slow the spread of novel
influenza A (H1N1) in their jurisdictions before the CDC
changed their recommendation regarding school closure.
Many respondents valued knowing what approaches
neighboring counties were taking regarding issues such
as control measures, vaccine distribution, and even pub-
lic messaging, even if this knowledge did not change their
own decisions regarding these issues for their jurisdic-
tions. In particular, three health officers noted the impor-
tance of the ABAHO jurisdictions occupying a shared
mediamarket. They explained that having consistentmes-
saging and policies in the region was important, and that
ABAHO was particularly valuable for coming to consen-
sus on different issues. When LHDs’ policies differed,
health officers had the information to explain why those
differences existed.
“One of the main benefits of ABAHO is it really
leverages the competencies and skill sets of each of the
individual counties and their resources to enhance all of
the counties’ ability to respond...[and] having a forum in
which health officers – health departments – can
discuss this, look at the surveillance data, look at our
local reality and come to, if not a consensus, an agreed
upon way of approaching something and a rationale if
there are differences”.
The Association of Bay Area Health Officials Pandemic
Influenza PlanningWork Group
The health officers and deputy health officers participating
in the study were asked about the strengths and weak-
nesses of the ABAHO Pandemic Influenza PlanningWork
Group that was formed in 2006. One notable benefit of
the planning process was that the group produced many
products. One product was a matrix of response decisions
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stratified by pandemic stage that would guide the discus-
sion of preparedness and response across jurisdictions.
One respondent explained the value of this particular
tool,
“We had done so much work, so much to the point that
we actually had a grid... that actually has decisions for
various stages for various measures that could be
implemented. Everything from surveillance to isolation
and quarantine to school closure, along with some
standard or templates for orders, for school closure... If
we hadn’t created [that] ahead of time we’d have to
invent it on the fly... It helped us to really understand
and have debates on why we’d be doing certain things
and help all opinions sort of get out there and come to
some bit of consensus.”
It was this type of rigorous, scenario-driven plan-
ning that helped health officials and other key decision-
makers become familiar with the challenges of addressing
an influenza pandemic prior to the arrival of novel
H1N1. The Work Group, now called the ABAHO Pub-
lic Health Preparedness Subcommittee, has since broad-
ened its focus to all-hazards events. Several interviewees
expressed a desire to see this type of work continue, not-
ing how valuable it proved to be in laying the groundwork
for the response to the H1N1 pandemic.
Regional communication about epidemiology issues
Currently, most epidemiologists and many health offi-
cers rely heavily on informal networks for communi-
cating about epidemiology and surveillance issues and
cited using these networks during the H1N1 pandemic.
These networks included professional groups, such as
the California Conference of Local Health Data Man-
agers (CCLHDM); workgroups sponsored by organiza-
tions such as the National Association of County and
City Health Officials (NACCHO), the Council of State
and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), and the Associa-
tion of Public Health Laboratories (APHL); epidemiology-
specific web-based Yahoo and Google groups; and peers
in similar job positions.
Many respondents, particularly epidemiologists, indi-
cated that they would like to have more regional com-
munication about epidemiology issues. Topics of interest
included sharing tools, resources, forms, statistical code
and analysis, best practices, use of ICS, developing mem-
oranda of understanding, and networking.
“I think it would be a great benefit to have some venue,
even if it was twice a year, to put epidemiologists
regionally in a room together and present a few things
and hash out a few things and talk informally... there
are so many things that, as epidemiologists, we do in
every county that literally one person – some central
person – could actually do way more efficiently.”
“We had a meeting recently as part of our regional
group where the [epidemiologists] got together and our
task was to discuss how to make epidemiology
regional...we decided there were a lot of ways that we
can help each other in terms of...data analysis, like if
you’ve already written [statistical] code for example. If
you already have a database set up. If we have
counties...in this region, counties that don’t have
epidemiologists, exploring how we can help.”
One respondent noted that efforts to share tools and
information among epidemiologists need to increase due
to the fact that epidemiology capacity in local health
departments in the region is declining.
“Of concern is that we seem to be losing epidemiologists
from our local health department. ...I think for the
counties that do have epidemiologists that our ability to
provide mutual aid to other counties is limited because
of our job duties and also because of our current
funding streams.”
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study conducted
with ABAHO, representatives from a group of LHDs
in the San Francisco Bay Area, that describes how
each LHD responded and worked with other LHDs
in the region during an infectious disease emergency.
Other studies that have reviewed various aspects of the
2009 novel influenza A (H1N1) experience (e.g., pub-
lic health surveillance activities, field investigations,
and laboratory considerations) have been published
[24-30]; the current study adds to this body of knowl-
edge by describing key aspects of LHDs’ epidemiology
and surveillance responses, including resource man-
agement, regional communication, and how LHDs
worked with one another during the response. In
addition, this study updates findings from a previous
study that examined local variation in public health pre-
paredness among a sample of LHDs in California [31].
Epidemiologic investigations, laboratory activities,
and public health surveillance are core public health
activities for protecting communities from infectious
diseases [6]. With the emergence of a novel virus in
human populations, many questions arose regard-
ing the epidemiologic features of infection with novel
influenza A (H1N1), such as the severity of illness
(case-fatality proportion, rate of hospitalization, etc.),
the transmissibility of the virus, characteristics asso-
ciated with infection and adverse health outcomes
[32]. The epidemiology and surveillance response
to novel influenza A (H1N1) was important for
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gathering the necessary information to answer the key
epidemiologic questions regarding the novel influenza
virus [33].
In order to understand LHD responses during the pan-
demic, it was important to understand the context in
which these public health systems operated. We con-
ducted semi-structured interviews with key informants of
the LHDs, collecting in-depth information about the per-
ceptions and experiences of public health professionals
responding to a novel virus, including details about the
complex processes outlined in our conceptual framework
(Figure 1). The interviews enabled the research staff to
engage local partners in order to collect potentially sensi-
tive information regarding lessons learned, organizational
performance, public health staffing and positions, leader-
ship, political considerations, organizational history, and
the “culture” of their organizations. This engagement with
local partners was crucial for building trust between the
research staff and the LHDprofessionals in order to obtain
the information needed for the study. The research staff
also reviewed documents about organizational activities
in order to augment the information obtained in the
interviews. This study revealed how each organization
utilized information from the environment (such as col-
lecting various sources of data and communicating with
public health professionals from other LHDs) in order to
make the best public health decisions during an infectious
disease emergency.
The study highlights the benefits of prior planning
and preparedness activities on organizational response
and communication during an infectious disease emer-
gency. Since 2006, there has been considerable investment
devoted to strengthening and maintaining public health
systems for a response to pandemic influenza; ABAHO
started its own pandemic preparedness planning as well
[18]. However, the emergence of novel influenza A (H1N1)
virus among humans in April 2009 caught the world by
surprise. For years, public health professionals had been
preparing for a scenario in which influenza A (H5N1)
would emerge from Southeast Asia [34,35], only to con-
front instead a novel influenza A (H1N1) virus of swine
origin in San Diego County, California [7,8]. Pandemic
planning scenarios assumed a “worst case scenario” with
a high level of illness severity, with some time from recog-
nition of the pandemic to widespread geographic dissemi-
nation [35]. Although the planning scenarios differed from
the actual events in 2009, the public health efforts that
were initiated prior to the 2009 pandemic had substantial
benefits that were not fully realized until 2009. Previous
regional planning activities for public health emergencies
(including pandemic influenza) among a group of LHDs
in the San Francisco Bay Area were crucial for communi-
cation and coordination of the public health response to
novel influenza A (H1N1) in 2009.
In addition, the study revealed many aspects of the
epidemiology and surveillance response among LHDs
that have implications for public health preparedness and
emergency response training, public health best prac-
tices, regional public health collaboration, and informa-
tion sharing. The public health workforce’s experiences
with these activities are critical for strengthening pub-
lic health systems and incorporating lessons learned into
the planning process in order to improve the response
to future infectious disease outbreaks and other public
health emergencies. The study showed that among the 12
LHDs, case reports, reporting of hospitalized and fatal
cases, and laboratory data were crucial sources for sit-
uation awareness, with the use of emergency room or
outpatient data supplementing the majority of the agen-
cies’ information. Perhaps even more importantly, the
interview data revealed the many challenges to collect-
ing school absenteeism data during the initial phases of
the pandemic, including a lack of information-sharing
agreements with local offices of education; lack of stan-
dardization and automation in these data systems; and
incomplete collection of the data. If these data sources
prove to be useful for monitoring a given public health sit-
uation, steps should be taken to address these problems
and strengthen the relationship between public health
agencies and school systems.
Several areas of successful collaboration among LHDs
were identified, including the sharing of laboratory capac-
ity, regional preparedness and response planning, and
public messaging from public health leaders. The study
found that there is a widely expressed desire for more
information sharing among public health professionals
involved in epidemiology and surveillance functions in the
region. Given the success of regional collaboration in the
aforementioned areas, improved regional communication
about epidemiology and surveillance issues may help to
strengthen regional preparedness, decrease inefficiencies
[31,36], and provide support for epidemiology functions at
a timewhenmany public health agencies are facing budget
cuts [37] or other challenges to maintaining epidemiology
capacity.
While the many experiences and perceptions described
in this study may not be unique to LHDs in the San
Francisco Bay Area, the research study describes the
individual local response to novel influenza A (H1N1)
as well as how a region of local health jurisdictions –
a region that had planned together – worked together
during an actual response. When faced with an emerg-
ing pandemic in an environment with limited resources,
many public health professionals commented that hav-
ing the ability to communicate about key aspects of
the response across jurisdictional boundaries was criti-
cal to their response. Perhaps the greatest concern, as
expressed by a key informant, pertains to the possible
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decline in organizational capacity due to funding cuts
in many local health departments [38]. Cuts in pub-
lic health preparedness funding undermine the ability of
public health departments to maintain the infrastructure
needed to carry out core public health activities, includ-
ing epidemiology and public health surveillance activities.
With many LHDs experiencing additional budget cuts
since this study was conducted, the region may have
less capacity now than it had previously which would
adversely affect the region’s ability to respond to a future
event.
The EpiNet study is subject to several limitations. First,
the results of this study are not necessarily generalizable
to other LHDs, due to the varying size, staffing levels,
and demographic characteristics of the populations in
the San Francisco Bay Area. In addition, it is unlikely
that these results will be generalizable to responses to
other infectious disease emergencies, given the unique
circumstances of the H1N1 pandemic. Nevertheless, the
study uncovered key aspects of the epidemiology and
surveillance response of LHDs in the San Francisco Bay
Area that will help strengthen the response to a future
event. Second, there may be additional individuals within
each organization (e.g., laboratory personnel) or indi-
viduals from collaborating organizations (e.g., hospitals,
schools, or CDPH) who could have provided additional
insights into the public health responses of LHDs. CDPH
played a crucial role in providing overall guidance to
and coordination of activities during the response, in
addition to characterizing important aspects of the epi-
demiology of the novel virus, such as factors (e.g., obe-
sity [39]) associated with death or hospitalization [9,40]
and severity of illness among pregnant and postpar-
tum women [41,42] and children [43]. However, CDPH
had a different role from LHDs in California. With lim-
ited research resources, the EpiNet Study focused on
the epidemiology and surveillance response of LHDs in
the San Francisco Bay Area and did not include key
informants from CDPH. While the EpiNet study exam-
ined many aspects of the response to the H1N1 pan-
demic, including sources of epidemiological data and
the use of ICS, the study team did not seek to eval-
uate the LHD responses to the pandemic. The study
was not equipped to evaluate the strengths of various
data sources gathered or variations of the ICS structure
employed. In fact, the study team was able to obtain
access to and trust of many key informants because
we made explicit that LHDs would not be evaluated.
Finally, the data were collected by self report through
key informant interviews; the data collection methods
did not include personal observations of organizational
performance. Despite these limitations, the information
obtained and the lessons learned in this study should
be helpful in discussions of how to strengthen overall
preparedness in the region, recognizing that the pan-
demic context had many features that were unique to its
circumstances.
Conclusions
The study demonstrated that among the 12 LHDs, case
reports, reports of hospitalized and fatal cases, and lab-
oratory data were crucial sources for situation aware-
ness, with the use of emergency room or outpatient
data supplementing the majority of the agencies’ infor-
mation. Perhaps even more importantly, the pandemic
revealed the many challenges to collecting school absen-
teeism data, including a lack of information-sharing
agreements with local offices of education, lack of stan-
dardization and automation in these data systems, and
incomplete collection of the data. Steps should be taken
to address these issues and strengthen the relationship
between public health agencies and school systems. The
study reviewed many aspects of the epidemiology and
surveillance response among LHDs that have implications
for public health preparedness and emergency response
training, public health best practices, regional public
health collaboration, and the perceived need for infor-
mation sharing. The public health workforce’s experi-
ences with these activities should inform the process of
strengthening public health systems and incorporating
lessons learned into planning for future infectious disease
outbreaks and other public health emergencies.
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